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FOREWORD: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
AS A COMMERCIAL COURT
RICHARD A. BOOTH*

INTRODUCTION

This issue of the Chicago-Kent Law Review focuses on the Seventh
Circuit as a commercial court. As the reader will soon discover, this is
not a traditional review of decisions of interest to commercial lawyers.
Nor is it even a presentation of highlights and coming attractions.
Rather the idea is to conduct a sort of thought experiment on how well
the Seventh Circuit weighs the realities of doing business in reaching decisions in three distinctly different areas of law, all of which have an
impact on commerce.
The three areas on which this symposium focuses on may be seen as
falling on a continuum from the very private to the very public. At the
private law end is the article by Richard Speidel of Northwestern University, which deals with decisions relating to warranties under Article Two
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 Somewhere in the middle of the continuum comes the article by Dennis Honabach and Roger Dennis, of the
District of Columbia Law School and Rutgers-Camden respectively,
dealing with the semiprivate law of corporations and, in particular, the
market for corporate control. 2 Finally, the article by Barry Kellman, of
DePaul University, deals with the commercial implications of the very
public law of the environment. 3 All of these topics are of vital importance to individual firms and thus to commerce in general as, indeed, are
many areas of law not ordinarily thought of as commercial.
The practicing lawyer will find little in the way of black letter law
here to guide his or her next presentation on the twenty-seventh floor of
219 South Dearborn. 4 Nevertheless, this symposium may be of more in* Visiting Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B., 1973, University of Michigan, J.D.
1976, Yale Law School.
1. Speidel, Warranty Disputes in the Seventh Circuit Under Article Two, Sales: Advantage
Seller?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813 (1989).
2. Dennis & Honabach, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 681 (1989).
3. Kellman, The Seventh Circuit on Environmental Regulation of Business, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 757 (1989).

4. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sits on the twenty-seventh floor of 219 South
Dearborn Street in Chicago, Illinois.
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terest and even of use to the commercial lawyer, or at least to litigators of
commercial disputes, than would be a catalogue of recent Seventh Circuit
decisions. After all, this symposium cannot predict what issues will next
come before the court. What this symposium can do, however, is offer
some impressions of how the judges on the Seventh Circuit think.
It is important to disclose the limitations of this undertaking. A
federal appeals court is in no position to make much law on its own,
particularly in the commercial area. For the most part, the cases that
come before it are either governed by state law or fall within the jurisdiction of some federal agency. Moreover, the selection of cases that come
before the court is largely determined by accidents of geography and the
jurisdictional choices of the parties. There is simply no assurance that
the sample of cases coming before any given circuit reflects a realistic mix
of commercial controversies. Finally, as Judge Easterbrook points out in
the Afterword,5 the court does not sit en banc. Thus, no three judge
panel can be sure that the remaining judges will agree with or acquiesce
in any given legal innovation. Indeed, the problem is compounded by the
fact that there are twelve other circuits addressing the same and similar
questions. While the Seventh Circuit applies its own precedents first, it
does not take lightly the prospect of creating a conflict with another
circuit. 6
Nonetheless, this symposium assembles a fair cross-section of commercial subject matter. The law of warranty is almost exclusively state
law. The law relating to corporations and securities often presents a mixture of state and federal questions; and while it sometimes involves the
Securities and Exchange Commission and even the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, just as often the court will be called on to render
its decision without the guidance or interference of any agency. The law
relating to the environment, of course, is almost exclusively federal and is
almost invariably administered by some government agency.
I.

PRIVATE COMMERCIAL LAW-THE LAW OF WARRANTY
UNDER THE U.C.C.

The first main article by Richard Speidel of Northwestern reviews
the decisions of the Seventh Circuit in warranty disputes under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 7 Speidel finds that sell5.
6.
circuits
7.

Easterbrook, Afterword: On Being a Commercial Court, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 877 (1989).
See 7TH CIR. R. 40(f) (Petitions for Rehearing) (opinions that would create a split in the
must be circulated to the entire court for majority approval before publication).
There is, of course, little question that warranty disputes fall within the ordinary under-
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ers prevail in warranty disputes in the Seventh Circuit much more frequently than one would expect. He is critical of the court for what he
sees as incomplete or unsound Code methodology. For example, he finds
what could almost be called a pattern of disfavor for consequential dam8
ages that, in his view, violates the delicate balance struck in the Code.
The comment on Speidel's piece by Paul Rogers and Lee Elizabeth
Michaels of Southern Methodist University largely confirms Speidel's
thesis that in theSeventh Circuit sellers enjoy an unusual advantage
when it comes to warranty disputes under the Uniform Commercial
Code. 9 They do not, however, necessarily agree with the reasons offered
by Speidel. For example, they point out that the Code itself seeks to be
both uniform and adaptable to changing commercial circumstances. In
order to decide how often the courts should intervene to provide a remedy in connection with a warranty dispute, it is important to recognize
how the law of warranty functions in the commercial setting. Warranty
issues only arise when someone has suffered a disappointment and the
parties have failed to settle the matter.' 0 The failure to settle is a crucial
fact. If the parties have gone to the litigation mat, presumably they are
willing to consider the possibility that their commercial relationship will
be forever ruined and that word of the dispute may lead others not to do
business with one or the other or possibly both of them. In short, in a
warranty dispute we are often dealing with a failed relationship. This is
true even of apparently one-shot deals since buyer and seller must assume that at least some future partners will hear of the dispute especially
if it ends up in court.
The upshot of all of this is that the law of warranty in the commercial setting functions primarily as a mechanism for after the fact settling
up between the parties. It is unlikely to have much effect on the planning
of a transaction or on a series of transactions. Indeed, a too expansive
interpretation may have a deleterious effect on the evolution of business.
If buyers are under the impression that they will be protected in cases in
which they have made their plans for the goods known to the seller, they
may prefer to let the seller take the risk of getting it wrong, rather than
considering the obvious alternative of integrating upstream and producing the difficult to specify good in-house.
In other words, the theory of the firm may come into play here. If it
standing of the category "commercial law." Hence, the traditionalist reader may prefer to look here
first for a traditional picture of the commercial prowess of the Seventh Circuit.
8. Speidel, supra note 1, at 837-39.
9. Id. at 818.
10. Id. at 817.
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is fairly easy for the buyer to communicate his or her needs to the seller
and to determine when those needs have been met, then the production
of the goods in question will continue to be handled on a contract basis.
However, if it is difficult to specify the required performance, and if warranty disputes arise frequently, it may make more sense for the buyer to
buy the seller rather than the goods. In short, letting the loss lie where it
falls may be unjust in particular cases, but in the grander scheme of
things, it may sooner induce business to orgAnize itself more
appropriately.
While the seller ordinarily knows the product better, the buyer ordinarily knows better the use to which it will be put. No amount of legislation will assure that the parties will communicate well with each other.
The real waste, then, is in duplication of effort. That is, holding the seller
liable because of mere knowledge or notice of what the buyer plans to do
with the goods requires the seller to duplicate efforts that have already
been made by the buyer, or at least should have been made. If the buyer
knows what he or she wants, why not simply require that it be specified
in the contract?
In short, it is hard to resist the idea that when it comes to bilateral
contracts, the parties' own bargain should prevail. There are no particular bargaining problems in such bilateral contracts situations other than
the ever present possibility that the bargaining power of the parties is
disparate. However, the Code itself refuses to recognize inequality of
bargaining power as a problem. What, then, is the point of an elaborate,
one might even say Byzantine, system of checks and balances designed
for all commercial settings?
The easy answer is the one that is often given in connection with the
law of corporations. That is, the U.C.C. provides a standard form agreement for the parties to a transaction. It is efficient because it allows the
parties to avoid much of the cost of contracting by providing them with
an off-the-rack contract. They may, of course, alter the contract if necessary within broad bounds. Thus, it might seem we have the best of both
worlds: a standard form contract for those who find it satisfactory or are
unwilling or unable to modify it, together with freedom to opt out of
virtually the entire thing for parties who prefer to negotiate their own
agreements.
But standardization can be inefficient. Clearly, if we found that a
particular term of the commercial code is more often opted out of than
left in place, we would have to ask whether it makes sense to retain it as a
standard term. Indeed, alarms should sound long before the half way
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point is reached. One might even argue that if a code provision must
often be opted out of, it is likely to catch a fair number of actors off
guard. Of course, it could be argued that frequent opting out merely
indicates that we have got the standard term wrong. It may also mean,
however, that having any standard term is a bad idea. Indeed, this seems
like a distinct possibility in the commercial area. The party with the
bargaining power will sometimes be the seller and sometimes the buyer.
Since most commercial actors subject to the U.C.C. are both buyers of
supplies and sellers of products, a generic law of warranty, for example,
making the seller liable if the seller knows or has reason to know of the
buyer's particular purpose for the goods, can just as easily lead to an
unjust result as to a just one.
So what do we get in return? As far as one can tell, it is a series of
new catch phrases like "basis of the bargain" together with some general
rules giving deference to commercial practice that may in the end do
little but add a layer of formality to the litigation of commercial disputes.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit may well be trying to confine the effects of the
Code more than the courts of the other circuits. It may be too that there
is a certain distrust of the Code and code systems at work. On the other
hand, there is also the inevitable tension with the notion that the judiciary should be restrained. In the area of private contracting, however, the
notion of judicial restraint has a potentially double meaning. It could
mean that the courts should attempt to apply the U.C.C. as much as
possible according to its letter. It could also mean, however, that the
courts should attempt to enforce the bargains actually entered into by the
parties with a minimum of interference from legislatively imposed standards. It occurs to me that what may be happening to commercial law in
the Seventh Circuit is rather similar to the Holmes epoch a little more
than a century back. It has been suggested after all that although
Holmes is viewed as a scholar of the common law, much of what he did
was completely disconnected from precedent, instead being motivated by
the pragmatism and later positivism that was beginning to boil at
Harvard after the Civil War. I
Rogers and Michaels in their comment on Speidel have done considerable original spadework. 12 They conclude that the Seventh Circuit has
not been especially influential in the decisions of other circuits. This is
not particularly surprising. Indeed, as a rule, a federal appeals court or11. Rogers & Michaels, Article Two Warranty Disputes in the Seventh Circuit:Advantage Seller
or Disadvantage Court?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 849 (1989).
12. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1974).
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dinarily looks to its own decisions first. That is as it should be: despite
the consequences of creating a split in the circuits, it is clearly worse to
create intracircuit inconsistencies. This leads one to wonder whether the
decisions of this or of any circuit are at least in part a reflection of local
conditions. Is it conceivable that the unusual advantage enjoyed by sellers in the Seventh Circuit, which sits in the heart of the Rust Belt, is in
some small way a result of the need to retool? In other words, is it not
possible that the court is motivated, or at least influenced, by the fact that
the states that compose the Seventh Circuit are in dire need of economic
revitalization?
II.

SEMI-PRIVATE COMMERCIAL LAW-CORPORATION LAW AND
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Corporation law is the focus of the article by Dennis Honabach and
Roger Dennis, of the District of Columbia Law School and RutgersCamden respectively. Their perspective is historical, a characterization
that is reinforced by the title of the comment thereon by Douglas Branson, 13 a self-styled corporate paleontologist who studies what he sees as
the relics of an earlier era when fiduciary duty flourished and the
14
Visigoths of law and economics were isolated in Hyde Park.
There can be little doubt that the Seventh Circuit has been a leader
in the development of corporation and securities law. Some of the very
biggest names in the pantheon of Supreme Court cases have been reversals of Seventh Circuit decisions. While some might regard that as embarrassing, it also indicates that the court has been innovative. And this
tendency predates the advent of Judges Posner and Easterbrook on the
court by several years.
Unlike the law of warranty, corporation law is fraught with obstacles to contracting, some of which are natural and some of which are
judicially imposed. In the first place, it is exceedingly difficult for
thousands of scattered shareholders to coordinate their efforts to influence corporate policy, in part because it is expensive, and indeed wasteful, to duplicate the communications facilities of the corporation, and in
part because even if one or a few shareholders were willing and able to
foot the bill for communicating with the rest, the rest would derive a
large part of the benefit from the efforts of the volunteers. The result is
that unless the volunteers expect to gain something special for their per13. Branson, A CorporatePaleontologistLooks at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 745 (1989).
14. The University of Chicago is located in the Hyde Park area of Chicago.
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sonal efforts over and above the enhancement in share value that all will
enjoy, or at least unless they stand to be paid back their expenses plus
some sort of bonus for risking their own money, many campaigns to influence the direction of the corporation will simply never get started.
Secondly, in addition to the strong disincentives for shareholders to
try to influence the direction of the corporation, there is the judicially
created Business Judgment Rule that provides that in the absence of a
conflict of interest the courts will not second guess the decisions of management as long as they are the product of adequate investigation and
deliberation and are not irrational. Several justifications have been offered for this rule, and all of them are good. First, hindsight litigation is
inappropriate in connection with forward-looking business decisions that
typically are made under conditions of uncertainty. Second, shareholders voluntarily assume the risk of bad judgment and therefore should not
be allowed to complain about it when it happens. That is, the shareholder invests in stock in hopes of the higher returns that come with
taking greater risk. To compensate the shareholder for mere bad judgment would thus be to confer a windfall. Third, to hold management
liable for those decisions that turn out to be bad will incline management
to choose business strategies that minimize the possibility of loss rather
than those that maximize overall return. In other words, a project that
offers a modest return but little chance of loss may be preferred over a
project that offers the possibility of spectacular returns and substantial
losses, even though the positive returns may far outweigh the losses.
Moreover, since most shareholders are diversified, they would clearly
prefer the corporation to follow the path that leads to the most wealth
irrespective of the possibility of substantial losses at individual firms.
Again, to allow them to sue after the fact because a particular decision
turned out to be unwise would be a windfall.
There is, however, yet another reason why shareholders should not
play an active role in influencing corporate policy, which is, in essence,
that too many chefs spoil the broth. The reason that management has
the power to manage is not simply that it is too cumbersome to put ordinary business decisions up to a vote of the shareholders. It is, rather,
that shareholder voting on forward looking decisions is inherently undependable. More often than not a corporation faces many choices in
formulating a business strategy. The decision does not tend to take a
binary form, that is, of X or not X. Instead it involves choices among
many attractive alternatives. Voting is an unreliable way to choose in
such situations. The outcome will often depend on the order in which
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the alternatives are presented. Thus, even if such matters were put up to
a vote, management could often engineer the outcome it desired.
All this means that management will ordinarily be free to run the
corporation pretty much without serious interference from the shareholders. The cost of the scheme, however, is that management is also
free to take steps that, while couched in business justifications, may be
primarily designed to keep management in office. As Honabach and
Dennis point out, the Business Judgment Rule has been a problem for
those influenced by the methods of law and economics.' 5 On the one
hand, the Business Judgment Rule makes sense. Indeed, most would argue that even the level of judicial interference allowed by the rule is excessive since the market should take care of disciplining those who make
more than their share of bad decisions. On the other hand, to the extent
that the rule shields takeover defenses from challenge, it seems to allow
management to insulate itself from market discipline. Thus, the courts
have found themselves on the horns of a dilemma.
Honabach and Dennis have looked for some sign that the Seventh
Circuit is in the process of re-inventing the Business Judgment Rule.
They conclude that Judge Posner might have been thinking along such
lines in his CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 16 opinions but that
in the end he felt constrained to fall back on traditional fiduciary duty
analysis. '7
Given that Judges Posner and Easterbrook have been especially active in this area, it is remarkable how consistent the court's recent decisions have been with its earlier decisions. Although the decision in
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 18 was highly supportive of the Business
Judgment Rule and gave corporations almost carte blanche to engage in
defensive tactics, it was a thoughtful decision and was cited in virtually
every important takeover case nationwide for years as the quintessential
statement of the rule. What was far more important than the rule, however, was the reasoning that lay behind it. The Seventh Circuit had, in
effect, laid out for all to see the central problem that arises in connection
with a takeover, namely, whether to characterize the question as a duty
of care question, in which case the Business Judgment Rule would almost certainly lead to management victory, or whether to characterize
15. Dennis & Honabach, supra note 2, at 682-83.
16. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69
(1987) [CTS IJ; Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986) [CIS I].
17. Dennis & Honabach, supra note 2, at 684-85.
18. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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the issue as a duty of loyalty issue, in which case management would be
required to justify its resistance.
Ultimately the Delaware Supreme Court answered the question by
inventing a new, intermediate level of scrutiny for takeover cases. However, Honabach and Dennis see signs of discontent on the Seventh Circuit. They suggest that doing away with the distinction between the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty may be the course favored by the Seventh
Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit has also been in the thick of the battle over the
constitutionality of state takeover statutes. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
has enjoyed a virtual monopoly in such cases. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.1 9
the United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Seventh Circuit's
decision declaring the Illinois takeover statute unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce. However, later in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 20 the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit's holding that the Indiana control share statute was unconstitutional on the same grounds (as well as on grounds of preemption). Then
in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.2 1 the court upheld
the Wisconsin business combination statute and the Supreme Court,
mercifully, denied certiorari.
These decisions emanating from the various states composing the
Seventh Circuit have addressed each major form of state takeover statute. Thus the court has had the rare privilege of being able to speak, and
to speak earlier than most other courts, on a range of statutes designed to
deal with a single major problem of corporate governance.
The last decision, however, is not easily understood. Amanda dealt
with the Wisconsin business combination statute, which in essence prohibits an acquiring corporation for a period of three years from merging
with its target, buying its assets, liquidating it, or engaging in any
number of other similar transactions unless the approval of the target
board is obtained in advance of the bidder's acquiring a ten percent stake
in the target. The merger ban applies even if the bidder acquires every
last share of the target, though it is unclear who would sue to enforce it
in such a case. Moreover, the Wisconsin law is mandatory. A Wisconsin
corporation cannot opt out of it as is the case with other state takeover,
statutes.
When Amanda was decided, both MITE and CTS were on the
19. 457 U.S. 624 (1982), aff'g 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
20. 481 U.S. 69 (1987), rev'g 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
21. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
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books. MITE continues to stand for the proposition that a state cannot
unduly burden interstate commerce by setting up a hearing procedure to
pass on the fairness of a bid made for a company with a significant presence in the state. Admittedly, the biggest problem with such a statute is
that it governs bids for companies that may be incorporated in other
states and thus presents the possibility of wildly conflicting regulations
of various states governing a single tender offer. CTS stands for the
proposition that a state statute that requires a vote of the shareholders to
enfranchise a bidder who has obtained a control position is consistent
with the kind of regulation that has traditionally been the business of the
states. While a statute that forbids mergers unless approved before the
bidder acquires control is also somewhat consistent with traditional state
regulation, it is inconsistent with the idea upheld in both MITE and CTS
that the market for corporate control should remain free of undue impediments imposed by the states. Yet Amanda is curiously silent on the
question whether the statute there is more like the statute struck down in
MITE or more like the statute upheld in CTS. It is as if the court simply
took the Supreme Court's decision in CTS as a signal that all state takeover statutes should thereafter be upheld.
Douglas Branson, the self-styled corporate paleontologist who provides the commentary on the Honabach and Dennis piece, finds their
views disturbing on two levels. First, he does not buy into some of the
more important premises of economic analysis in connection with corporation law. He doubts that investors are as diversified as they are often
presumed to be and doubts that they should necessarily always be diversified. He does not think that the market is efficient as often as it is
assumed to be; nor does he think the market for corporate control works
all that well in connection with many smaller companies.
Second, Branson does not believe that even those judges who are
inclined to economic analysis would ultimately be comfortable following
the dictates of that school. Branson thus takes issue with the idea that
Judge Posner only reluctantly fell back on fiduciary duty analysis rather
than proceeding wholeheartedly to construct a new corporate norm
based on the distinction between control cases and all other cases. Branson's theory, which may be correct, is that Judge Posner has been overcome, as it were, by the reality of his role as a judge.
Somewhat inconsistently, Branson is critical of state takeover law
and of the Seventh Circuit for having upheld the Wisconsin business
combination statute in Amanda. This is only a minor, or perhaps illusory, inconsistency. Branson seems to be of the view that a vigorous
market for corporate control among larger companies is highly desirable
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and that the market should be unimpeded by state takeover legislation. 22
As he points out, state takeover legislation is a quick, effective, and relatively cheap way for the biggest companies to protect themselves from
takeover without the need for a shareholder vote and without the negative publicity and negative impact on share prices that often go with

adopting company-specific takeover defenses.
Honabach and Dennis see the Amanda decision as fraught with
double entendre. They are of the view that it is really a call for federal
legislation. There may be some truth in this, but the better view might
be that Judge Easterbrook meant what he said: Competition among the
states will eventually winnow out those laws that prove bad for shareholders. 23 The alarm has been sounded before about the race to the bottom in corporation law, but as it turns out the frontrunning Delaware is
not so bad a place for shareholder rights after all. Studies show that
when a company reincorporates there, it enjoys an immediate and permanent increase in the price of its stock.
III.

PUBLIC COMMERCIAL LAW-THE LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The third main article, authored by Barry Kellman of DePaul, is a
review of recent environmental law decisions by the Seventh Circuit.
Admittedly, environmental law is not ordinarily thought of as a commercial law subject. Nonetheless, environmental law is a particularly good
crucible in which to conduct a commercial law thought experiment. Environmental law is, of course, instinct with public policy. How strictly
such laws are written and enforced is a direct expression both of how
important our society thinks a clean environment is relative to further
development and of how much we are willing to spend of both public
money and idled resources to further that goal. However, environmental
law is also intensely commercial both in theory and in the details of its
administration.
Theoretically speaking, environmental law is the quintessential expression of the notion that a business should bear all the identifiable costs
of its activities; this assures that its product will be appropriately priced
and that the free use of public goods will not subsidize the growth of
businesses beyond what society would want if made to bear the full costs.
Thus, a court that is particularly well-attuned to this idea and that is also
a respected commercial court may often surprise one side or the other of
22. Branson's worries about diversification, the efficient market, and the market for corporate
control are primarily in connection with smaller companies. See Branson, supra note 13, at 752.
23. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 507 (Easterbrook, J.).
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a controversy. In any event, it is especially interesting to see a court that
is regarded by some as radically conservative deal with questions in connection with which conservative theory dictates what would often seem
to be a traditionally liberal result.
Practically speaking, environmental law is intensely administrative.
That is, although it is imbued with public policy, the policy decisions
have already been made by Congress. What is left for the courts is to
review how well the Environmental Protection Agency (or other body)
has carried out its mission. Here the truly commercially sensitive court
can probably be expected to scrutinize administrative decisions for the
benefits intended by Congress relative to the costs entailed by the methods employed by the agencies. At the very least, a commercially sensitive court should favor certainty and the concomitant ability to plan
one's affairs over delay and failure to decide.
It seems fair to say that Kellman is disappointed with the performance of the Seventh Circuit on environmental issues. He sees a conflict
between judges who would require expansive environmental impact
statements and judges who would ignore any factors that cannot be assigned a dollar value. While somewhat encouraged by the trend toward
strict scrutiny of agency action and the striking lack of deference to
agency expertise, Kellman is clearly discouraged by the apparent inability of even potentially activist judges to force reluctant agencies to act.
Furthermore, he is distressed by the impression that nothing ever seems
to get answered. On this last point at least, Susan Franzetti, who comments on the Kellman piece, seconds the emotion. 24 As she sees it, the
Seventh Circuit is not a particularly hospitable place for business because
it is too difficult to get a straight answer, and thus investment decisions
are rendered riskier than they need to be. In short, as far as business is
concerned, any answer would be better than no answer at all.
Kellman is also somewhat critical of the court for refusing to extend liability for clean up costs to a supplier of hazardous raw materials
on the theory that the supplier is "disposing" of the materials. In Kellman's view, if the Seventh Circuit had followed the arguable lead of the
Eighth Circuit, it would have lengthened the list of those who may be
liable for the nation's hazardous waste sites. 25 That is certainly true, but
it does not necessarily follow that cleanup would therefore proceed more
rapidly. It might be that the longer the list of potentially liable parties,
24. Franzetti, Comment on the Seventh Circuit's Environmental Regulation of Business, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803 (1989).
25. Kellman, supra note 3, at 798-99.
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the greater the likelihood that they will sue each other over who is really
to blame. It is also likely that some firms, perhaps even many, will "get it
wrong" at the planning stage. Some will incorrectly reckon that they
will be liable for less and others will figure that they will be liable for
more than will turn out to be the case when the smoke clears. It may
well be, then, that the planning process and the clean up process as well
will proceed more swiftly and surely if the burden is placed on fewer
rather than more parties. The party with the burden, of course, will be
able to build into its prices the costs of the risks it bears. The end result
is thus to replace uncertainty and litigation with contracting and perhaps
insurance. These same considerations no doubt came into play in the
court's recent decision in City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp.,26 where the court, speaking through Judge Cummings and joined
by Judge Easterbrook over the dissent of Judge Cudahy, refused to extend liability to Monsanto, a supplier of PCBs, under Indiana tort law.
The argument there had been that Monsanto participated in the tort by
attempting to advise and monitor Westinghouse's handling of the PCBs.
The court quite rightly rejected that argument with the observation that
to penalize Monsanto for its good faith efforts to limit the hazard would
discourage suppliers of toxic materials from making any effort to avoid
misuse of their products by their customers. In short, the Seventh Circuit's decisions in this area have been quite laudable.
I would like to thank all of the symposium contributors for their
considerable efforts in connection with this project. Each of the articles
and comments that appears here ventures well beyond what would have
been necessary to assemble a mere review of recent events and trends in
the Seventh Circuit. Without exception, the authors and commentators
have striven to understand the philosphy and dynamics of this court of
appeals and have, I believe, succeeded in jointly producing a truly insightful work. I would like also to thank the staff of the Chicago-Kent
Law Review for their tireless efforts.

26. 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1989).

